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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Several studies show that despite recent increases in the number of 
minor conflicts, long-term trends suggest that international and civil 
wars are declining.1  Analyzing the causes of the improvement in global 
security since 1990, the 2006 Human Security Report argues that the 
United Nations (UN) played a critically important role in spearheading a 
huge upsurge of international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding activities.2  The evidence that these initiatives worked is 
not just circumstantial.  Contrary to popular perceptions, a recent RAND 
Corporation study, for example, found that two-thirds of the UN’s 
peacebuilding missions had succeeded.3  In addition, the sharp increase 
in peacemaking efforts led to a significant increase in the number of 
conflicts ending in negotiated settlements.4  The annual cost of the 
charges to the international community has been modest—well under 
1% of world military spending.5  The United States Government 
Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the United States 
approximately twice as much as the UN to conduct a peacekeeping 
operation (PKO) similar to the UN stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH):  an estimated $876 million compared to the UN 
budgeted $428 million for the first fourteen months of the mission.6  In 
fact, in 2006, the cost of running all of the UN’s nineteen PKOs around 
the world for an entire year was less than the United States spent in Iraq 
 
 1. Human Security Brief 2006, Human Security Report Centre (2006), available at 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2006/overview.aspx.  See also Human Security 
Report 2009/2010:  The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (2010), Human Security 
Report Project, available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx 
[hereinafter Human Security Report 2009/2010]. 
 2. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, The Challenges of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil 
War, in HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 39, 51 (Bjørn 
Lomborg ed., 2006).  See also Human Security Brief 2006, supra note 1, at ch. 3.  The Human 
Security Report 2009/2010 makes the same point and states that, while not suggesting that it is the 
sole explanation, peacemaking and peacebuilding makes a difference.  Human Security Report 
2009/2010, supra note 1, at pt. I. 
 3. JAMES DOBBINS, A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 6 
(2007) (including testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on June 13, 2007). 
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. See Financing Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/ 
financing.shtml; UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ 
documents/backgroundnote.pdf.  The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from July 2010 
to June 2011 is approximately U.S. $7.3 billion.  This represents about 0.5% of global military 
spending, estimated at U.S. $1.531 trillion.  Id. 
 6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-331, PEACEKEEPING:  COST 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL UN AND HYPOTHETICAL US OPERATIONS IN HAITI 7 (2006). 
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at the height of the Iraq war in a single month.7  Despite the positive 
changes, the RAND Corporation study makes it clear that there are no 
grounds for complacency.8 
Although the number of wars has decreased, far too many remain—
and there are still several places of instability around the globe that could 
easily turn into conflict areas.  Furthermore, because the underlying 
causes of conflicts are too rarely addressed, the risks of new conflicts 
breaking out in the same area and old ones starting up again remain very 
real.  This happened in Haiti where the UN is in its second peacekeeping 
mission to the country.9  In terms of the challenge to establish enduring 
peace in conflict zones, the Security Council has emphasized that “the 
biggest deterrent to violent conflict is addressing the root causes of 
conflict, including through the promotion of sustainable development 
and a democratic society based on a strong rule of law and civic 
institutions, including adherence to all human rights—civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural.”10  One of the determinants of success, 
therefore, of any peacekeeping mission is the extent to which it has the 
capacity to address the root causes of a conflict in the host state of the 
mission.  In August 2000, a famous UN report, the Brahimi Report, 
acknowledged the shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping efforts and 
recommended wide-ranging reforms aimed at strengthening the 
operations and making them more effective.11  Since then there have 
been numerous other reports aimed at implementing reforms to 
strengthen UN PKOs.12 
 
 7. Dobbins points out that the UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force 
provider.  In its specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military 
capabilities needed for nation building.  DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 2.  All missions UN missions are 
planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN 
headquarters in New York.  Id.  Most troops come from Third World countries whose costs per 
deployed soldier are a small fraction of any western army.  Id.  See also Richard Wolf, Afghan War 
Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm.  
 8. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 8. 
 9. Ian Martin, Paper Versus Steel:  The First Phase of the International Civilian Mission in 
Haiti, in HONORING HUMAN RIGHTS AND KEEPING THE PEACE:  LESSONS FROM EL SALVADOR, 
CAMBODIA, AND HAITI 83 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1995). 
 10. S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
 11. Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Rep., transmitted by identical letters dated Aug. 21, 2000 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).  The report is called the 
Brahimi Report after its chairman of the committee which produced the report. 
 12. E.g. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/608 (Dec. 
15, 2004). 
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This Article builds on that report and discusses the broad 
challenges facing UN peacekeeping missions today and the role of the 
UN PKOs in the resolution of conflicts and in the reconstruction of post 
conflicts states.  The objective of the Article is to identify areas that need 
attention to make peacekeeping missions more effective.  The Article is 
broken down into the following sections:  (II) peacekeeping in theory 
and practice; (III) the peacekeeping mandate; (IV) conditions and factors 
that can help determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission; 
and (IV) the broad challenges that face peacekeeping missions. 
II.  PEACEKEEPING:  BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 
The UN was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”13  Meeting this 
challenge is the most important yardstick by which the organization is 
judged by the people it exists to serve.  One of the most important ways 
in which the UN intervenes in conflicts and promotes peace is through 
PKOs.  Given the centrality of peacekeeping to UN peace initiatives, it is 
somewhat surprising that no precise definition of peacekeeping can be 
found in the UN Charter.14  It would appear, therefore, that the 
“technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United 
Nations.”15  In all likelihood, this is the result of the fact that the 
Charter’s authors “envisaged that threats to international peace and 
security would primarily consist of aggression by one state against 
another. . . . Peacekeeping was not envisaged as part of the 
organization’s role, which lay primarily in establishing a system of 
collective security.”16  Peacekeeping missions do not seem to fit within 
the scope of the activities specified by chapter VI of the Charter, which 
concerns the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” or chapter VII of the 
Charter, which addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”17  As a practical matter, 
when establishing a peacekeeping mission, the Security Council has 
 
 13. U.N. Charter preamble. 
 14. FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 717 
(2d ed. 1993). 
 15. Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security and International Peacekeeping, 
in NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER:  THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY 
59, 62 (Alan K. Henrikson ed., Scholarly Res. 1986). 
 16. ALEX J. BELLAMY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 46 (2004). 
 17. See U.N. Charter art. 33-51. 
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usually invoked chapter VI of the UN Charter.18  Peacekeeping missions 
are distinct from enforcement actions undertaken by the UN under 
chapter VII of the Charter, as “[e]nforcement action is directed against a 
state or other political entity, and has a coercive design.  U.N. 
peacekeeping, on the other hand, is not directed ‘against’ a particular 
wrongdoer and traditionally has involved coercion only in a minimal 
sense, if at all.”19  The Charter contains a tension between the doctrines 
of national sovereignty and the protection and promotion of individual 
rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the context 
of a civil war.20  Although the preamble of the Charter contains an 
affirmation to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,”21  article 
2(7) states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”22 
PKOs have been a major activity of the UN almost since its 
establishment in 1945.  The UN has been involved in over sixty-three 
peacekeeping missions since 1948.23  As the practice has evolved over 
the years, a PKO has come to be defined as an operation involving 
military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the 
UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas 
of conflict.24  These operations are voluntary and based on consent and 
cooperation.  While they involve the use of military personnel, the 
peacekeeping missions achieve their objectives not by force of arms, 
thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the UN under 
article 42 of the Charter.25  UN peacekeeping missions typically also 
 
 18. BRUCE R. PIRNIE & WILLIAM E. SIMONS, SOLDIERS FOR PEACE:  CRITICAL OPERATIONAL 
ISSUES xi (1996). 
 19. KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 716. 
 20. The Charter, in Chapter I, Article 2(7), guarantees sovereignty by providing that 
“[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”  U.N. Charter art. 2, para 
7.  But in Article 13, the United Nations undertakes to promote human rights.  Id. at art. 13, para 1. 
 21. Id. at preamble. 
 22. Id. at art. 2, para. 7. 
 23. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ 
statistics/factsheet.shtml. 
 24. A former UN Legal Counsel has defined peacekeeping operations as actions involving the 
use of military personnel in international conflicts situations on the basis of the consent of all parties 
concerned and without resorting to armed force except in cases of self defense.  E. Suy, Peace-
Keeping Operations, in A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (R.J. Dupuy ed., 1988). 
 25. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides for the Security Council to take 
enforcement measures as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.  
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involve a large number of civilians and civilian police.26  UN 
peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic mechanism developed by the UN 
and is means to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for 
lasting peace.27 
The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when 
the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military 
observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.28  Over the years, UN 
peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and 
a changing political landscape.  During the Cold War, when cold war 
rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping 
goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing 
situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political 
level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.29  They operated under 
UN command and were primarily mandated with the implementation of 
activities agreed upon by warring factions, such as the cantonment and 
separation of belligerents, the monitoring of borders, and the verification 
of the ceasefire.30  With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context 
for UN peacekeeping dramatically changed, prompting the UN 
organization to shift and expand its field operations from “traditional 
missions” involving strictly military tasks to complex 
“multidimensional” enterprises designed to ensure the implementation of 
 
Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of members of the United Nations.  U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 26. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operation:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/627 
(Dec. 28, 2007). 
 27. Dag Hammarskjld referred to peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter VI and a half,” 
which puts it between traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution such as negotiation and 
mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII.  60 Years 
United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations Information Service, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/ 
pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf. 
 28. KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 720.  
 29. 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, 
http://un.org/en/peacekeeping/ operations/surge.shtml. 
 30. See generally Larry M. Forster, Training Standards for United Nations Military 
Observers:  The Foundation of Excellence, 6 AFR. SECURITY REV. 4 (1997).  Jakkie Cilliers and 
Greg Mills observe, “Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely a matter of 
upholding a peace already agreed to. After the fall of the Berlin Wall peacekeeping became more 
ambitious as the international community sought to rebuild failed states  and grapple with complex 
emergencies.”  See Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills, From Peacekeeping to Managing Complex 
Emergencies:  Peace Support Missions in Africa, in FROM PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX 
EMERGENCIES:  PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA 2-3 (Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills eds., 1999). 
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comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundation for 
sustainable peace.31 
The transformation of peacekeeping missions reflects in the UN’s 
own words more than hybridization:  “The goals of Peacekeeping 
Missions have in fact changed significantly:  from assisting in the 
maintenance of ceasefires during cold war PKOs during the 1990s 
increasingly becoming peacebuilding missions.”32  The broad and 
complex mandates of today’s multidimensional peace operations reflect 
the varied civilian, military, and police capabilities required to provide 
support to the challenges of modern day peacekeeping.  These include 
tasks such as promoting political transitions, assisting in the 
development of political structures, demobilization of armed forces, the 
provision of humanitarian relief during emergencies to refugees and 
internally displaced people, establishing the rule of law, promoting 
security, supporting disarmament, holding elections, and jump-starting 
the economy.33  As an example, the UN Operation in Mozambique 
involved peacekeeping, the demobilization of armed forces, provision of 
humanitarian aid, democratization, demining, the return of Mozambican 
refugees that had fled to neighboring countries, and electoral support 
which culminated in the 1994 general election which ushered in a post 
conflict government.34  Other missions—including the UN Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in 
South Africa (UNOMSA) in South Africa, the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL)—had huge electoral mandates that included 
organizing elections and monitoring the electoral process.35  Indicative 
 
 31. 60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, supra note 29. 
 32. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacebuilding:  Lessons 
from Recent Experience (Apr. 1999).  In those days the UN were defenders of the status quo, and 
operated with light arms under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defense. 
 33. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 26, ¶ 19.  See also Peter H. Gantz, The Postconflict 
Security Gap and the United Nations Peace Operations System, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, 
AND RECONCILIATION:  WHEN THE WARS END 247 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2007).  In Mozambique “the 
United Nations established a trust fund to help RENAMO transform itself from a military 
movement into a political party.”  UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, at 4 (1995) [hereinafter THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995].  The UN argues that the “transformation of a guerrilla force, 
experienced only in war, into a political entity with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the 
most significant legacies of the United Nations operation” in Mozambique.  Id. 
 34. THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33. 
 35. Jeff Fischer, Elections and International Civilian Policing:  History and Practice in Peace 
Operations, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SERVICES WHITE PAPERS (June 18, 
2002).  ONUMOZ was established by Security Council Resolution 799 in December 1992 to help 
implement the general peace agreement signed on October 4, 1992 by the president of Mozambique 
7
Ndulo: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
10-NDULO_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCX 8/15/2011  2:16 PM 
776 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:769 
of the change in strategy was a 1999 UN report which recommended that 
“mandates should be conceptualized flexibly and could include elements 
of peacebuilding and emergency reconstruction of war torn 
economies.”36 
In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council launched an 
unprecedented number of PKOs.37  By the mid-1990s, political and 
financial support for PKOs had waned, especially from the United States 
after the failure of the United States-led (and UN-sanctioned) mission in 
Somalia in 1992 and 1993.38  Support from troop-contributing countries 
shriveled as the UN fell behind in its payments and military challenges 
in civil war situations mounted.39 
Despite the supposed broad array of conflict management 
techniques, international attention remains fixed on “peacekeeping” or 
the utility of multinational interventions as an essential element in the 
amelioration or resolution of armed conflict.  The frustrating aspect of 
the approach is that even as the perceived demand for peacekeeping has 
increased, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to have 
diminished.40  This is largely because of the huge cost implications of 
PKOs.  The two UN missions in Southern Sudan and Darfur faced many 
difficulties in deployment, coordination, and making the missions 
 
and the president of the Resistancia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO).  UNTAG was established 
in accordance with Resolution 632 of February 1989 to assist the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under 
the supervision and control of the UN.  ONUSAL was established on May 20, 1991 by Security 
Council Resolution 1991.  Its mandate was to verify the implementation of all agreements between 
the government of El Salvador and Frente Farbundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional aimed at 
ending a decade long civil war.  UNTAC was established by Security Council Resolution 745 of 
February 28, 1992 to ensure the implementation of the Agreement of a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on October 23, 1991.  UNOMSA was 
established by Security Council Resolution 772 in 1992 and 1994 to assist the people of South 
Africa in their transition from apartheid South Africa to a non-racial democratic society.  Id. 
 36. Rep. of the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping:  Lessons 
from Recent Experience (1999). 
 37. THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:  FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 620 (David 
M. Malone ed., 2004).  Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observed that “the early 1990s were the high 
water mark in the euphoria of the post-cold war era of peacekeeping.  While 13 operations were 
established in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched since 
1988.”  Cilliers & Mills, supra note 30, at 1. 
 38. ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA:  LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE AND 
GUINEA-BISSAU 16 (2002). 
 39. DOBBINS , supra note 3, at 3. 
 40. Rep. of the Special Comm. On Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶¶ 
7-8, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
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operational.41  The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was set up by the 
UN Security Council in March 2005.42  Its mandate was to support the 
implementation of the Southern Sudan Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.43  The African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), an AU/UN hybrid operation and one of the largest UN 
missions ever, was established by the Security Council in July 2007 to 
bolster the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur which had been 
operating there since 2004.44  Its mission is to oversee the 
implementation of Darfur peace agreements and to protect civilians.45  
The first mission deployed in Sudan under the leadership of the AU 
faced enormous challenges with equipment, which negatively impacted 
their effectiveness.  Soon after the AU deployed forces, rebels drove into 
an AU base in eastern Darfur, stole technical equipment and weapons, 
and killed ten Nigerian peacekeepers.46  Poorly equipped and outfitted, 
the AU soldiers did not have a chance.  They could not defend 
themselves adequately nor could they hunt their attackers; the 
peacekeepers did not have helicopters to do that.  The deployment 
situation has since improved, as the mission was transformed into a 
UN/AU hybrid mission but peacekeeping efforts have been limited as 
the mission lacks a peace agreement to implement.47  The mission 
remains a peacekeeping mission in the midst of ongoing conflict.  The 
demands of UN peacekeeping will always test the will of the 
international community to promote peace and security in the world’s 
conflict areas.  Despite widespread recognition that, in order to be 
effective, UN peacekeeping needs the concrete contributions of the 
member states in the form of personnel, finances, and political support, 
 
 41. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan:  Domestic, Sub-Regional and Extra-
Regional Challenges 3 (2010). 
 42. S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
 43. The 10,000 strong UN mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), which was launched to support the 
implementation of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, faced many challenges.  DANIEL LARGE & CHRIS SAUNDERS, STABILIZING 
SUDAN:  DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES 7 (2010). 
 44. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
 45. On July 31, 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1769 authorizing 
the deployment of a 26,000 strong United Nations-African Union force to help implement peace 
agreements.  S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).  In part 15(a)(ii), the 
resolution invoked Chapter 7 to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
 46. Alexander Schwabe, Failure Looms for Darfur Peacekeepers, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 23, 
2007, http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,5193330,00.html. 
 47. Center for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan:  Domestic, Sub-Regional, and Extra-
Regional Challenges 8 (2010). 
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the international community invariably fails to meet the needs of 
PKOs.48 
As the UN peacekeeping enterprise declined after the Somalia 
failure, the United States started to promote “regional” approaches to 
peacekeeping, particularly through NATO.49  The Clinton administration 
deployed United States military personnel to Kosovo, first as part of a 
NATO air operation to force the withdrawal of Yugoslavia troops from 
Kosovo, and next as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.50  But after the 
war in Kosovo in spring of 1999, broad opposition to unilateral 
peacekeeping led to a revival of the UN variety of peacekeeping.51  
Major new UN PKO (PKO) missions in East Timor,52 Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ivory Coast, and the Congo brought another surge in 
international peacekeeping.53  Today there are almost 124,000 personnel 
serving hundreds of millions of people around the world.54  There are a 
total of sixteen peacekeeping missions in place, including seven in 
Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia, three in Europe, and three in 
the Middle East.  This represents a nine-fold increase in UN 
peacekeeping since 1999.55 
There can be no dispute that UN peacekeeping missions have had 
mixed results.  There have been successes and failures.  Mozambique, 
Cambodia, and East Timor are examples of successful transitions from 
conflict to stable states.  A troubling aspect is that there have been cases 
where second missions have been necessary, such as in Liberia and 
Haiti.56  It is important, therefore, to examine the problems faced by 
 
 48. Schwabe, supra note 46. 
 49. Sarah B. Sewall, U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations (Carr 
Ctr for Human Rights Pol’y, Working Paper 01-3, 2000). 
 50. In the Balkans, the intervention in Kosovo was a NATO mission. 
 51. Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy:  the Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV. 
INT’L REV., May 6, 2006, http://hir.harvard.edu/interventionism/legality-to-legitimacy. 
 52. The United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11, 1999 
and ended on October 25, 1999.  East Timor—UNMISET—Background, http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/background.html.  A second mission, United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), was established to administer the territory.  
Id.  At independence UNTAET was succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET), established by Security Council Resolution 1410 of May 17, 2002 to provide 
assistance to core administrative structures critical to the validity and political stability in East 
Timor.  S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002). 
 53. Both Liberia and Haiti have had repeat missions.  See Charles Arthur, Building Peace in 
Haiti, 4 U.N. Chronicle 69 (2000-2001); ADEBAJO, supra note 38, at 43. 
 54. UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/ 
2010/factsheet.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
 56. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:  Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-Keeping:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) 
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peacekeeping missions and consider how best to organize them to 
effectively promote peace and development to troubled parts of the 
world. 
Given the potentially unlimited scope of activities that can be 
encompassed by the term “peacekeeping mission,” it is useful to 
examine the categories of missions periodically undertaken by the UN.  
There are two policy documents that define the nature of PKOs:  An 
Agenda for Peace57 and the Brahimi Report.58  Peacekeeping has 
evolved rapidly in the past decade from the traditional, primarily 
military model of observing ceasefires and forcing separation fighting 
forces or parties after interstate wars, to incorporate a complex model of 
many elements, military and civilian working together to build peace in 
the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.  Boutouros-Boutorous Ghali, in 
his An Agenda for Peace, outlines five types of missions:  (1) preventive 
diplomacy; (2) peace making; (3) peacekeeping; (4) peace enforcement; 
and (5) peacebuilding.59 
A. Preventive Diplomacy 
Through preventive diplomacy, the UN seeks to remove the sources 
of danger before violence erupts.  This means taking actions that are 
aimed at easing tensions before they result in conflict.  It also means 
early warning of impending conflicts based on information gathering 
and fact finding.  It is clear that early warning systems are not working 
as effectively as they should; otherwise, such tragic situations as Darfur 
could have been foreseen (and prevented).  Rather, it seems that civil 
society (non-governmental organizations and the media) often do a 
better job than the UN system.  Indeed, it was the nongovernmental 
 
[hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].  After the Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) brokered a peace agreement in 1993, the Security Council established the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by Resolution 866 in 1993.  The mission was 
completed in 1997.  The war resumed.  After a peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1509 in 2003.  The United 
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by Resolution 867 in 1993.  The crisis resumed 
in 2004 and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established by 
Resolution 1542 in 2004.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (2000).  
This report is commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report after its chairman Lakhdar Brahimi.  The 
report was published in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request that the panel 
review UN peacekeeping operations and make recommendations to assist the United Nations in 
conducting such activities better in the future.  It is regarded as one of the key documents on 
peacekeeping in the UN.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 59. See An Agenda for Peace, supra note 56. 
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organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch that first warned the world 
about Darfur.60  To effectively provide early warning, the UN would 
need (improved) capacity in both information gathering and analysis of 
information. 
However, it bears noting that, even when information has been 
available, responses to outbreaks of conflict have been slow, often 
hobbled by conflicting foreign policy interests of Security Council 
members and the reluctance of states to incur the human, material, and 
financial cost of UN intervention.61  Perhaps the clearest and most cited 
example of this is the failure to act in Rwanda.  It is well known that the 
UN Force Commander in Rwanda, General Dallaire, on January 11, 
1994, wrote to then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan informing him of 
information received indicating that Hutu extremists were preparing to 
exterminate Tutsis and that major arms caches could be identified by the 
informant.  General Daillaire stated that his forces were prepared to act.  
Annan’s response was that Dallaire was not to confront the extremist, as 
that was not within his mandate.62  Thus, capacity to provide early 
warning may be rendered moot if not met with the willingness to act 
upon such information—and prevent or at least mitigate the warned-
about crises. 
B. Peace Making 
Peace making falls between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict 
and keeping the peace; it involves efforts to bring hostile parties to 
agreement by peaceful means.  Peace making addresses conflicts in 
progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy 
and mediation.  Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of 
states, regional organizations, or the UN; peacemakers may likewise be 
unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case in 
Mozambique, where negotiations leading to a peace accord were led by 
a team of four non-UN personnel.63  Peace making may even be the 
 
 60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 16 DARFUR DESTROYED:  ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT 
AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 6(A) (May 6, 2004).  The report is an extensive and 
detailed documentation of the killing of thousands of people by the Government and militias allied 
to it.  The report accused the Sudanese Government of being responsible for ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. 
 61. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 9.  An example is the delayed response to the Rwanda genocide 
in 1994.  See generally ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL:  THE FAILURE OF 
HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004). 
 62. DALLAIRE, supra note 61, at 142-46. 
 63. Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and Liberation Front of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) “agreed on four individual mediators, representing the Italian Government, (Mr. Mario 
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work of a prominent personality, working independent of or with the 
UN, such as George Mitchell, Jr.’s work in Northern Ireland or Kofi 
Annan’s work in Kenya.  More specifically, as a United States Special 
Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, Jr. chaired all party 
negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.64  For his 
part, Kofi Annan chaired the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, 
which led the peace process following Kenya’s post-election violence in 
2007,65 bringing about a peace agreement after the country was at the 
brink of collapse.66 
C. Peacekeeping  
At another level, peacekeeping is when conflict has broken out and 
the UN intervenes in order to assist in keeping peace; such initiatives 
aim to create space for the parties to negotiate a settlement.  Examples 
include peacekeeping missions in South Africa, Haiti, Liberia, Balkans, 
and East Timor.67  Typically, the UN deploys a large force to keep the 
parties apart and enforce whatever peace accords to which the parties 
agree.  In most cases, in the interest of speed, the UN allows an 
international force or a country to act on its behalf before it deploys.  For 
example, in East Timor and Haiti, the UN allowed the Australian 
government and the United States government, respectively, to deploy 
troops before the UN deployed.68  Such an approach is more time 
efficient, given that the UN does not have a standing army, and it 
therefore always takes a while before it can assemble and deploy a 
peacekeeping force.  Notably, the speed at which deployment proceeds 
 
Raffaelli), the Sant’ Egidio Community, (Professor Andrea Riccardi and Don MatteoZuppi) and 
Mozambique’s Episcopal Conference (Archbishop Jaime Goncalves).”  THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33, at 16. 
 64. ELISABETH LINDENMAYER & JOSIE LIANNA KAYE, A CHOICE FOR PEACE?:  THE STORY 
OF FORTY-ONE DAYS OF MEDIATION IN KENYA 1 (Aug. 2009). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992) (United Nations Observer 
Mission in South Africa); S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004) (United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti); S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (United 
Nations Mission in Liberia); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo); and S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 
(Oct. 25, 1999) (United Nations Mission in East Timor). 
 68. United Nations Foundation, Keeping the Peace:  A Brief Guide to UN Peacekeeping, UNF 
Insight:  New Ideas for International Cooperation. 
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depends entirely on troop contributions from member states and the 
timely availability of resources to finance the mission.69 
D. Peace Enforcement 
This constitutes a type of military activity that, while coercive in 
nature, remains distinct from war.  The concept of peace enforcement 
rests on the premise that force is being used to enforce a mandate.  An 
example would be the use of force in Sierra Leone to make the rebels 
abide by the peace agreements they had signed.  It is also found in 
country doctrines.  According to the United Kingdom military doctrine, 
peace enforcement initiatives are neither in support of nor against a 
particular party, but are designed to restore peace and ensure compliance 
with the mandate in an evenhanded manner.70  The problem with peace 
enforcement is always going to be how to ensure that the use of force 
will not influence the political dynamics of the conflict.  The side against 
whom the enforcement is being carried out is likely to view the UN 
peacekeepers as enemies.  Accordingly, a UN report encourages caution 
in the use of the peace enforcement option, warning that it “was 
impossible to stop a war by spreading it.”71  The solution is to expect the 
Force Commander to excise good judgment as to when an enforcement 
measure would be appropriate. 
E. Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that defines activities 
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something 
that is more than just the absence of war.72  This occurs after both a 
ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached.  In other words, 
in these cases, the parties have already agreed upon their solution to the 
conflict.  These types of operations incorporate a substantial number of 
civilians alongside the military component.  Thus peacebuilding is not 
limited to demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants into civilian 
 
 69. New Challenges for International Peacekeeping Operations:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 70-77 (2009) (testimony of Erin A. Weir). 
 70. See MINISTRY OF DEF, JWP 3-50, THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS (2d ed. June 2004). 
 71. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶ 
20 U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
 72. Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, ¶ 13, 
www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/.  
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society; peacebuilding also includes building institutions of governance, 
building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule of 
law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police and 
judicial and penal reform).  Peacebuilding further includes improving 
respect for human rights through the monitoring of, education on, and 
investigation of past and existing abuses and providing technical 
assistance for democratic transition (including electoral assistance and 
support for the development of free media and civil society, as well as 
promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques).  In 
Somalia, the Security Council, in March 1993, envisaged a role for 
UNOSOM II that involved far more than simply the continuation of the 
first mission which was charged with securing an environment for 
humanitarian assistance.73  Indeed, Boutros Ghali called for a mandate 
that “would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the 
Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and 
political life, re-establishing, and recreating a Somali state based on 
democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and 
infrastructure.”74  Another example is East Timor.  On October 25, 1999, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1271, establishing the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), with overall 
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of 
justice.75  The Resolution included provisions to provide security and 
maintain law and order; establish an effective administration; assist in 
the development of civil and social services; ensure the coordination and 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development 
assistance; support capacity building for self-government; and assist in 
the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.76 
The UN has created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),77 the 
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),78 and the Peacebuilding Support Office 
(PBSO)79 to address the needs of peacebuilding in countries emerging 
 
 73. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 58, 101, U.N. Doc. S/25354 
(Mar. 3, 1993). 
 74. Id. 
 75. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 
 76. Id. ¶ 2. 
 77. The Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2006 through General Assembly 
Resolution A/60/180 and Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645-2005.  S.C. Res. 1645, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).  It has already funded over 115 projects in fifteen countries.  It is 
managed on behalf of the Secretary-General by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding 
Support Office.  The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) is the PPF Fund 
Administrator. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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from conflict.  These institutions form a key addition to the capacity of 
the international community in terms of a broader peace agenda.  The 
PBC brings together all the relevant actors (including international 
donors, international financial institutions, national governments, and 
troop-contributing countries); marshals resources; advises on and 
proposes integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery; and, where appropriate, highlights gaps that threaten to 
undermine peace.80  The mandate of the PBC is comprised of three 
objectives:  (1) to promote post-conflict peacebuilding through 
mobilizing relevant actors both within and outside the UN and to devise 
strategies and identify the resources necessary for the promotion of post-
conflict reconstruction; (2) to help bridge the gap between the immediate 
post-conflict phase and sustainable peace through the identification of 
relevant public institutions to support recovery and economic 
development; and (3) to provide a monitoring and review function to 
facilitate information sharing among all parties concerned.81  The 
Commission funds projects and helps in building institutions that 
promote economic development and good governance.  The PBC has 
four criteria for funding projects:  (1) respond to imminent threats to 
peace processes and initiatives that support peace agreements and 
political dialogue; (2) build national capacities to promote coexistence 
and peaceful resolution of conflict; (3) stimulate economic revitalization 
to generate peace dividends; and (4) establish essential administrative 
services.82 
III.  THE MANDATE AND THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
In any peacekeeping mission the mandate serves as the constitution 
of the operation.  A peacekeeping83 mandate informs a PKO.  Although 
scholars and practitioners use the term “mandate” in different ways, for 
the purposes of this article, “mandate” refers to the broad objectives and 
specific instructions that define, limit, and guide a PKO.  Although it 
varies by PKO, there is generally not one document that provides the 
complete mandate of a PKO.  Instead, the mandate is found in Security 
 
 80. S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping in his Agenda for Peace as “the deployment 
of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of the parties, normally involving UN 
military and/or police and frequently civilians as well.  Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”  An Agenda for Peace, 
supra note 56, ¶ 20. 
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Council resolutions, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security 
Council, and relevant peace agreements relating to the mission.  What 
peacekeepers are authorized, obligated, inclined, and equipped to do is, 
in large part, determined by these documents.  In fact, much of what is 
known by the public about peacekeeping mandates is how little a given 
mandate has authorized the peacekeepers to use force and equipped them 
to protect civilians.  We can all remember how peacekeepers in Rwanda 
cried desperately for a more robust peacekeeping mandate that would 
allow them to use force defensively as well as offensively to carry out 
their tasks as outlined in the mandate.  Recall the story of General 
Derille, the Canadian Force commander in Rwanda, and his famous fax 
to UN headquarters.84 
One of the weaknesses of the process of developing a mandate is 
that many of the actors involved in the creation and development of the 
mandate are not acquainted with how other actors involved in the same 
process operate.  This is partly due to the fact that the process behind the 
creation of a mandate is often ad hoc, disjointed, and unpredictable.  The 
key actors are the Security Council members and the donor states that 
are responsible for the funding of the mandate.  A typical UN mandate 
contains the following elements:  a background to the situation being 
addressed, the objective of the mission, the powers of the mission, the 
tasks to be implemented, the rules of engagement, and sometimes the 
mechanisms to be used to implement the mandate.  For example, 
Resolution 772, which in 1992 set up the UN Observer Mission in South 
Africa (UNOMSA), called upon UNOMSA “to strengthen and reinforce 
the indigenous mechanisms set up under the National Peace Accords, so 
as to enhance their capacity in the building of peace, both in the present 
and in the future,”85 and  Resolution 1769 setting up the UN African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) invokes Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians.86 
Developing a mandate is an inherently political process.  Often, 
Security Council members receive instructions from their capitals and 
make rigid proposals with little flexibility.  The process is not inclusive 
of other member states of the UN who are given no avenues to influence 
 
 84. DALLAIRE, supra note 61, at xii.  General Dallaire served as UN force commander in 
Rwanda during 1993-1994.  Id.  He sent the famous fax to UN headquarters informing the UN that 
he had come across military cashes and asked to take them over where upon he was informed that it 
was not in his mandate.  Id. 
 85. S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992). 
 86. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
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the process.87  Importantly, mandates are both legal and political in 
nature.  As such, while the language employed by the mandate drafters 
can have legal consequences, the rationale behind this language is 
almost completely politically driven.  The drafting of a mandate involves 
many actors, ranging from Security Council members to the warring 
factions of the host country88 to officers from the UN political and 
peacekeeping departments.  Mandates are a result of consensus among 
the parties involved in its development—which parties are not 
necessarily directly involved in the conflict.  Mandates’ objectives range 
from assisting in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement to 
preventing an outbreak of conflict and delivering humanitarian relief 
supplies, to administering a territory for a transitional period and 
conducting elections.89 
The mandate of a PKO must be distinguished from the legal basis 
regulating the implementation of the mandate.  The legal framework is 
founded on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that is concluded 
between the UN and host state.90 Among other things, the SOFA allows 
the establishment of the mission; importation of equipment and flying 
rights; and incorporates the privileges and immunities of the 
peacekeepers which define the legal limits that peacekeepers are bound 
to when implementing a mandate’s broad objectives and specific 
instructions.  For example, while a mandate will include a request for 
ceasefire verification, the legal framework will ensure operational needs 
of the mission and that, unless the UN waves immunity, in the event any 
peacekeeper commits a crime during such the duration of the mission, he 
or she will not be subject to the host state’s legal systems.91  The SOFA 
sets specific terms for the conduct, privileges, immunities, and 
jurisdictions of the military and civilian employees on matters such as 
criminal and civil jurisdiction.92 SOFAs provide for immunity for 
peacekeepers from local jurisdictions and establish exclusive jurisdiction 
 
 87. ELLIE B. HEARNE, INT’L PEACE INST., FROM NEW YORK TO THE FIELD:  A DIALOGUE ON 
U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS 6 (2010). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See RAY MURPHY, U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON, SOMALIA AND KOSOVO:  
OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN PRACTICE 17 (2007). 
 90. U.N. DEPT. OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT, 
HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS:  MULTDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 13 (2003) 
 91. See Muna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of 
Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Missions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 126 
(2009). 
 92. See Press Release, Security Council, Secretary-General Says Signing of Status of Forces 
Agreement “Positive Step Forward” in effort to Deploy Darfur Mission, U.N Press Release 
SG/SM/11414, AFR/165, PKO/176 (Feb. 14, 2008). 
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of the troop-contributing peacekeepers’ nation of origin.93  These are 
important norms without which peacekeeping missions could not operate 
effectively.  Host states could easily frustrate the work of missions by 
subjecting them to sham prosecutions and harassment to impede their 
work. 
Immunities for UN workers are grounded in articles 104 and 105 of 
the UN Charter.  These articles provide that the UN and its staff enjoy 
such privileges and immunities in territories of member states as are 
necessary for the independent exercise of their function.94  They give 
immunity to the UN and its employees, including peacekeepers, when 
operating in foreign territory.95  While the founders of the UN did not 
intend that the privileges and immunities of officials should constitute a 
shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes committed in a state 
hosting the UN operation where crimes have clearly been committed, the 
International Court of Justice has held that personnel employed directly 
by the UN on mission receive functional immunity from prosecution for 
acts committed while executing their duties.96 
It bears noting that, while the SOFA guarantees the legality of the 
peacekeepers’ conduct on the territory of a sovereign country and 
outlines the conditions under which the force shall operate in the host 
state,97 the Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the armed forces the 
authority for the use of force, delineating the circumstances and 
limitations under which the peacekeepers may initiate or continue 
combat engagement when encountering other forces.98 
The elaboration of a mandate relies on the Secretary-General’s 
report of the situation in the host state.  Typically, prior to the conclusion 
of the preparation of the report the Secretary-General sends a special 
envoy to the area to get first-hand information about the situation on the 
ground.  For example, in the case of UNOMSA following South Africa’s 
Baipatong massacres on June 17, 1992, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted (on July 16, 1992) Resolution 765 by which it, 
 
 93. See Ndulo, supra note 91, at 153. 
 94. U.N. Charter art. 104-105; see also B. SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:  A 
COMMENTARY 1302 (2002). 
 95. See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 111. 
 96. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of United Nations (The Mazilu Case), 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177, 29 ILM 98 (Dec. 15, 1989). 
 97. See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 109; see also M. R. KOCHHAR, UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING AND OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 30 (2000). 
 98. See James Burger, Legal Issues in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, in 7 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING YEARBOOK 425, 431-33 (Michael Bothe & Boris Kondoch eds., 2001); JOINT 
DOCTRINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, J-1-02. 
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inter alia, invited the Secretary-General to appoint a Special 
Representative for South Africa to recommend—after discussion with 
the parties in the country—measures which would assist in bringing an 
effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations 
leading to a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial, and united 
South Africa.99  The Secretary-General appointed Cyrus R. Vance as his 
special representative to South Africa.  Following Vance’s report, the 
Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council, which led 
to the adoption of Resolution 772 on August 17, 1992.  Resolution 772 
formed the mandate of UNOMSA.100 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of reliance placed on the 
Secretary-General’s report by the Security Council will depend on the 
nature and clarity of the report.  That is, a report that describes the 
situation on the ground and frames the issues but does not suggest 
approaches to addressing these issues will be helpful for the drafting of 
the mandate but will not become the actual mandate.  It stands to reason 
that the most useful Secretary-General reports are those that clearly 
identify the issues and suggest solutions.  However, some reports—even 
those that present issues and solutions—may not become part of the 
mandate because the Security Council members’ resources and interests 
do not coincide with the requests or suggestions made by the Secretary-
General in the report. 
After the adoption of the mandate, the Secretary-General sends one 
or more Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) to develop a concept of 
operations for the mission, assess the situation on the ground, and 
determine the local dynamics of the situation.101  Typically, a small 
TAM is sent before the mandate is finalized to assess the financial and 
technical implications of deploying mission and a more fully-fledged 
TAM is sent after the adoption of the mandate.102  TAMs will generally 
include representatives from the DPKO and the Department of Field 
 
 99. S.C. Res. 765, ¶ 4 U.N. Doc. S/RES/765 (July 16, 1992). 
 100. Final Rep. of the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the U.N. 
Secretary-General (May 26, 1994).  See also S.C. Res. 772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/772 (Aug. 17, 1992). 
 101. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, Forming a New Operation, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newwoeration.shtml [hereinafter Forming a New 
Operation].  See also Technical Assessment Mission Guidelines, http://www.unddr.org/tool_ 
docs/DDR-technical-assessment_mission_guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Technical Assessment 
Mission Guidelines]. 
 102. See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101.  See also Technical Assessment Mission 
Guidelines, supra note 101. 
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Support (DFS).103 The representatives of the DPKO may include, 
depending on the purpose of the TAM:  the Office of Operations, the 
Office of Military Affairs, and the Office of Rule of Law and Security 
Institutions (including the Police Division, the DDR Section, and the 
Mine Action Service).104  Increasingly, TAMs include representatives of 
other UN agencies, such as the UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR, 
UNHCR and UNAIDS.105  While in the country, the TAM meets with all 
stakeholders, including NGOs. 
As was noted previously, many peace agreements form the basis of 
the peacekeeping mandate such that either the mandate includes 
provisions of the peace agreement or the mandate provides for the 
implementation of the peace agreement.  In those situations, the UN 
(through the PKO) has as its mandate the implementation of the peace 
agreement, such as was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Afghanistan.106 
An issue that often arises in both developing the mandate and in 
PKOs is the extent to which the UN can use neighboring countries as 
partners in both processes.  The use of neighbors has its advantages.  As 
Mark Malan points out “neighbors are more familiar with each other’s 
problems than outsiders.  Neighbors usually have a fairly common 
culture, a common social identity, a common history and 
experiences.”107  In the Namibian peace process, neighboring states—the 
“frontline states” as they called themselves—played a significant role in 
facilitating the agreement that became the basis of the Namibian peace 
process.108  In 1977, a pressure group, the Western Contact Group, was 
formed and included Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.109  The group launched a joint diplomatic effort to 
bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for 
 
 103. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101.  See also Technical Assessment 
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101. 
 104. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101.  See also Technical Assessment 
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101. 
 105. See See Forming a New Operation, supra note 101.  See also Technical Assessment 
Mission Guidelines, supra note 101. 
 106. S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999). 
 107. Mark Malan, Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa, in FROM 
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES:  PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA, supra note 30, 
at 15. 
 108. See Namibia-UNTAG Background, 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm. 
 109. Id. 
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Namibia.110  The Western Contact Group’s efforts led to the presentation 
in 1978 of Security Council Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian 
problem.111  The settlement proposal, as it became known, was worked 
out after lengthy consultation with South Africa and the Frontline States 
(Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).112  
The disadvantage to the involvement of neighboring states is that 
proximity sometimes can mean that the “neighbors” are not neutral and, 
at worst, they can be involved in the conflict.  This was the case in the 
Congo in the 1990s following the removal of the Mobutu regime, where 
a number of neighbors (Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Angola) 
intervened militarily in the conflict and became part of the problem.113 
On many occasions, one of the Security Council permanent 
members—or another member state—will take the lead in designing and 
drafting a particular PKO mandate.114  The sponsoring member state 
writes the first draft of the mandate, which is subsequently circulated to 
the Security Council.115  This tends to happen in cases where the 
member state has a strong interest in ensuring that the PKO successfully 
solves the conflict.  For example, the United States took the lead in 
drafting the mandates for both UNMIH (Haiti) and UNITAF (Somalia), 
France took the lead in drafting UNOCI’s (Cote D’Ivoire) mandate, 
France and the U.S. together took the lead in drafting Lebanon’s 
UNIFIL, and the EU and other European states together took the lead in 
drafting UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina).116 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. United Nations Transitional Group (UNTAG) was established in 1978 with a mandate of 
assisting the Special Representative of the  Secretary-General to ensure the independence of 
Namibia through free and fair elections under the UN.  See S.C. Res. 435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435 
(Sept. 29, 1978).  For a detailed discussion of the role of the Frontline States in the settlement of the 
Namibian problem, see GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, ALLIES IN ADVERSITY:  THE FRONTLINE STATES 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY, 1975-1993 (1994). 
 113. WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE, REPORT:  U.S. ARMS TO AFRICA AND THE CONGO WAR-
WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE-RESEARCH PROJECT (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/ 
arms/reports/Congo.htm. 
 114. See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory Coast’s 
Gbagbo, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
5869:france-and-nigeria-introduce-un-resolution-calling-for-sanctions-against-ivory-coasts-gbagbo& 
catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=67; and Louis Charbonneau & Patrick Worsnip, France Asks UN Security 
Council to Sanction Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/ 
us-ivorycoast-france-un-idUSTRE72O6KR20110325. 
 115. See Nigeria and France Introduce UN Resolution Calling for Sanctions Against Ivory 
Coast’s Gbagbo, supra note 114; and Charbonneau & Worsnip, France Asks UN Security Council 
to Sanction Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo, supra note 114. 
 116. The military operation that went to Haiti on September 1994 was led by the United States.  
This later led to the establishment of UNMIH by Security Council Resolution 867, adopted on 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/5
10-NDULO_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCX 8/15/2011  2:16 PM 
2011] UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 791 
After the sponsor nation finalizes the drafting of the mandate (in the 
form of a Security Council resolution draft), informal consultations 
begin.  There is no official record of this process.  During this meeting, 
the Security Council reviews the draft as well as the full Secretary-
General report and the peace agreement (if there is one) and decides 
what sections to include in the mandate.  Once the Security Council has 
extensively reviewed the mandate, formal consultations begin.  At this 
point, the Security Council member states publicly explain their decision 
to either support, abstain, or veto the Security Council resolution.117  
There a is a strong view that the Security Council should involve troop-
contributing countries in the consultation process regarding the 
establishment or renewal of the mandate of a PKO in a more meaningful 
manner and from the outset of the mandate’s elaboration.118 
A. Modification of Mandates 
Mandates frequently change or are supplemented.  A peacekeeping 
mission may find that its mandate is deficient at the time of initial 
deployment or that the mandate does not address issues that have 
emerged since deployment.  It is always a challenge to assess—prior to 
 
September 23, 1993.  See UN Haiti Background, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pastunmihbackgr2.html.  The initial UN intervention 
in Somalia, UNITAF, was a force organized and led by the United States.  The intervention was by 
Security Council Resolution 733, adopted on January 23, 1992, authorized to use all necessary 
measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.  See 
United Nations Operation in Somalia II, 
http://www.un.org/DEpts/DPKO/Missions/UNOSOM2b.htm.  The United Nations operation in 
Cote D’Ivoire, UNOCI, created by Security Council Resolution 1528, adopted  on February 27, 
2004, was to support the implementation of the 2003 ceasefire Lina-Marcoussis Peace Agreement 
brokered by France.  See United Nations Peacekeeping Better World Campaign, 
http//www.betterworldcampaign.org./un-peacekeeping/missions/Cote-d’Ivoire.html.  The United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was originally established by Resolution 425 and 426, adopted on 
March 19, 1978.  Following the July/August conflict, Resolution 1701 was adopted on August 11, 
2006, calling for a halt in fighting in Lebanon and the deployment of Lebanese and United Nations 
Forces in Southern Lebanon.  This resolution was drafted by France and the United States.  See 
Warren Hoge, Resolution to Halt Fighting in Lebanon Is Unanimously Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 2006.  The European Union played a major role in the establishment of UNPROFOR.  
Resolution 914, adopted on April 27, 1994, was introduced in the Security Council by European 
states.  See THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PART I:  GENERAL ISSUES 65 (Daniel 
Bethlehem & Marc Weller eds., 1997). 
 117. For a comprehensive coverage of the Security Council’s debate regarding UNPROFOR’s 
mandate, see THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PART I:  GENERAL ISSUES (Daniel 
Bethlehem & Marc Weller eds., 1997). 
 118. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶ 
17, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
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deployment—how the mandate will work and how warring factions, 
troops, and civil society will react to the mission.  It is thus natural that 
once the PKO is deployed in the field, its mandate should be revised to 
reflect local needs.  In fact, the most successful missions are those that 
are flexible and easily adaptable to the needs on the ground.119  This 
flexibility is particularly important to ensure that the mandate and 
mission remain relevant to the conditions prevailing in the conflict state.  
In South Africa, for example, Resolution 772—which did not include an 
electoral component—was supplemented by Resolution 894 to respond 
to the request of the Transitional Executive Council that the UN provide 
a sufficient number of international observers to monitor the electoral 
process and to coordinate the activities of the international observers 
provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and 
the European Union as well as by governments.120 
There are several reasons why PKO mandates change.  First, some 
missions do not get feedback from the ground until the PKO is 
deployed—due to, for example, lack of access to the country because of 
fighting or hostility from the warring factions.  Thus, it is not until they 
are in the host country that PKO officials can fully grasp what is 
occurring locally.  Frequently, changes are simply due to the fact that a 
specific task within the mandate is fulfilled and thus replaced by an 
updated one.  As an example, once disarmament has occurred, a PKO 
may be required to aid in the reintegration of the ex-combatants into 
society.  Furthermore, PKOs do not receive all the necessary resources 
for full implementation and therefore must constantly change their 
strategies depending on how many troops and the level of financial 
support received.  In fact, many PKOs find that their donors and initial 
supporters lack the political will initially promised, which in turn leads 
to false expectations.  Finally, regardless of such shortcomings, conflicts 
are characteristically unpredictable, requiring constant adaptation. 
As rightly observed in an UN report, when changes are made to 
existing mandates, commensurate changes should be made to the 
resources available to the PKO to carry out its new mandate.121  Changes 
should be based on a thorough assessment of the situation after full 
 
 119. U.N. Ass’n in Can., Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding:  Lessons from the Past, Building for 
the Future 60 (2007). 
 120. S.C. Res. 894, U.N. Doc S/RES/894 (Jan. 14, 1994). 
 121. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶ 
55, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
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consultation with the Security Council and troop-contributing states.122  
Revisions to a mandate may be implemented by the Security Council 
passing a new resolution that formally modifies or adds to the PKO 
mandate.  For example, the mission initially dispatched to Bosnia-
Herzegovina was not meant to end any war, but rather to deliver 
humanitarian aid.123  As Kofi Annan explained, the “nature of the 
conflict, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ and concentration camps, seemed 
to call for something more ambitious.”124  UNPROFOR soon found itself 
containing the conflict with measures such as an arms embargo and a no-
fly zone to promote a ceasefire.  However, this change, and many other 
changes in mandates, did not occur with widespread agreement.  In fact, 
on May 30, 1994, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued for a 
revision of the UNPROFOR mandate “so that it would include only 
those tasks that a PKO could be reasonably expected to perform in the 
circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”125 
A shift that has occurred on several occasions with PKOs is moving 
from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate.126  This occurred in the UN 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-2005) and in the UN 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC, 2000-present) due to a deteriorating security situation on the 
ground.127  The new mandates authorize the PKO to take “the necessary 
action” to ensure freedom of movement and protection of civilians.128  
Other shifts require the creation of an entirely new PKO the necessary 
change is so drastic that modifying an already existing mandate may not 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Andrzej Sitkowski, Reflections on the Peacekeeping Doctrine, in 7 INTERNATIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING:  THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS 185 (Michael Bothe & 
Boris Kondoch eds., 2002). 
 124. Kofi Annan, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and National Sovereignty in Internal 
Armed Conflict, in HARD CHOICES:  MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 63 
(Jonathan Moore ed., 1999). 
 125. See Andrzej Sitkowski, Reflections on the Peacekeeping Doctrine, in 7 INTERNATIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING:  THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 181. 
 126. Boutros-Ghali warned against this shift in the 1995 Supplement to the Agenda for Peace; 
the 2000 Brahimi Report did the same, arguing instead to go in stronger and then draw down, rather 
than the other way around.  Missions established post-2000 have accordingly had bigger authorized 
strengths, more “robust mandates” (especially with respect to protection of civilians—which greater 
highlighting in the article), less restrictive ROEs, and greater force capabilities (e.g., attack 
helicopters in MONUC). 
 127. See S.C. Res. 1291, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999). 
 128. See generally Jane Boulden, United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa, in 
DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA:  THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 11 
(Jane Boulden ed., 2003). 
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be enough.  This occurred in Somalia between 1992-1995 in the 
transition from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to UNOSOM II.  Somalia 
experienced a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace 
enforcement, and nation-building.129  UNOSOM I began as a mission to 
support humanitarian relief, but was soon overwhelmed by the Somali 
warlords.130  Even with a Chapter VII mandate, the PKO lacked the 
force of arms and thus had to transition into a full-fledged military 
operation that did not resolve the Somali crisis.131  The UN does not 
presently have a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.  It has authorized an 
African Union Mission (AMISOM).132  Unfortunately, the Somalia crisis 
continues as a Humans Right Watch report observes:  “Somalia is nation 
in ruins, mired in one of the world’s most brutal armed conflicts of 
recent years.”133 
IV.  CONDITIONS AND FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SUCCESS OF A 
PEACEKEEPING MISSION 
This section identifies critical factors that impact on the success of 
a mission.  Most of the conflicts are characterized by the combination of 
internal and international factors in the conflict with serious human 
rights violations and large scale suffering among the threatened civilian 
population, which inevitably results in large numbers of refugees and 
displaced persons.  Very often, conflict is a symptom of an intrastate 
crisis that is deeply rooted in the following conditions:  authoritarian 
rule; exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-economic 
deprivation; and weak state structures that lack the capacity to handle 
normal political and social conflict.134  Against this background—and 
cognizant that generalizations can be dangerous—a number of factors 
seem to determine the success of an intervention:  cooperation of the 
parties implementing the mandate; continuing support of the Security 
Council; readiness of the states to provide financial, technical, and 
materials resources to the mission; the need to deal with both past and 
 
 129. See MURPHY, supra note 89, at 48. 
 130. Id. at 33. 
 131. Id. at 35. 
 132. S.C. Res. 1964, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1964 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
 133. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT:  SO MUCH TO FEAR:  WAR CRIMES AND THE 
DEVASTATION OF SOMALIA 1 (2008). 
 134. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace 
and Sustainable Development in Africa: , Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-
S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998). 
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current human rights violations; the need to deal with gender issues; and 
leadership of the mission.  Each of these issues warrants discussion. 
A good mandate should be clear and practical and be backed by 
secure funding.  In order to structure a clear mandate there must be a 
clear understanding of the nature of the problem and the underlying 
cause.  The strategic implication of this is that in structuring mandates 
and UN missions, we must focus on the structural causes of conflict in 
order to build a solid foundation for peace and ensure a future free of 
conflicts.  For example, in the case of Liberia, poverty, authoritarian 
rule, and the old conflict between Americo-Liberians and indigenous 
Liberians documented by J. Gus Liebenow in his 1969 book Liberia:  
The Evolution of Privilege, has contributed significantly to the crises 
Liberia has experienced.135  In Afghanistan, poverty, authoritarian rule 
by the warlords and the Taliban, and denial of basic human rights are 
major factors that contributed to the ignition of the crisis situation that 
continues today.  In present-day Darfur, religious tensions and the 
attempt by the Arab population to ethnically cleanse the North of the 
black Sudanese population are significant factors in the conflict.  Such 
crisis situations underscore that political stability requires structural 
accommodation of diversity.  In other words, for the purpose of devising 
UN mandates and missions, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
symptoms and causes of intrastate crises.  Peacekeeping efforts which 
treat the symptoms rather than sources of conflict lack a built-in exit 
strategy and often lead to failure.  The Somali crisis is often given as an 
example of this phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, the resources and energies of the international 
community tend to be mobilized around the symptoms—rather than the 
causes—of conflicts.  As a result, traditional peacekeepers have 
remained in place for several decades, such as in Cyprus and the 
India/Pakistan border.  It must also be taken into account that 
peacekeeping increasingly involves internal wars with armed elements 
only partially under the control of those who consent to a UN 
deployment.  In these cases, it might be necessary to first stabilize the 
situation before a PKO can be deployed, as was the case in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone.  In some contemporary post-conflict situations, 
peacekeeping forces may need the ability to use force, if necessary, to 
keep the initiative of the peace process on track and to defend the 
peacekeeping mission and its mandate.  A clear mandate must address 
the need to use force in such circumstances.  The Eastern Congo is an 
 
 135. See generally J. GUS LIEBENOW, LIBERIA:  THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE (1969). 
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example of a situation where the use of force was necessary to confront 
the militias terrorizing the civilian population. 
The mandate must be guided by the understanding that peace 
making and peacebuilding are primarily the responsibility of local rather 
than foreign actors.  Although it may seem counterintuitive, the UN 
PKOs may be more effective when the UN is not intricately involved in 
the peace negotiations at the outset of the talks.  In Cambodia in the 
1990s, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an array of 
informal meetings that allowed all the relevant regional actors to make 
their preferences known.136  As a result, even though the interests of 
Vietnam and China were diametrically opposed throughout the 
negotiations process, the UN mandate was able to avoid association with 
the dispute and to assume some semblance of impartiality.  Similarly, in 
the South African peace process, local stakeholders negotiated a 
settlement and the UN helped implement it through monitoring the peace 
accord structures and supporting the elections process in 1994.137  Such 
successful examples highlight that the peace process must seek ways of 
involving the local people in all aspects of its operations to the fullest 
extent.  It must also seek to involve regional actors. 
Involvement of regional actors is important and holds relatively 
untapped potential for the UN.  The current missions in Sudan and 
Somalia are examples of a growing collaboration between the UN and 
the Africa Union.  Regional actors can help players reach solutions 
compatible with local traditions and can act as guarantors to the peace 
process.  Clearly, such interactions will require a greater amount of trust 
on the parts of both the UN and regional actors.  Regional actors are 
sometimes skeptical of the UN’ intentions.  On the other hand, the UN 
has experienced difficulties in relation to capacities on the part of 
regional actors, and even regional organizations face problems of 
capacity.138  The AU Mission in Darfur which preceded the current 
 
 136. The United Nations Mission implemented the Paris Agreements concluded by Cambodian 
parties.  Under the agreements all parties agreed to end international involvement in the Cambodia 
conflict, transform the military conflict into a political one and entrusted the holding of elections to 
the United Nations.  See David Ashley, Between War & Peace:  Cambodia 1991-1998, Nov. 1998, 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/between-war-peace.php. 
 137. See Muna Ndulo, United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa:  Preventive 
Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, in 3 AFR. YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 222-23 (1995). 
 
 138. Mark Malan, Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa, in FROM 
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES:  PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA, supra note 30. 
Malan observes that:  “the political frameworks for conflict management in the various African sub 
regions are still in elementary stages of development.” Id. at 21. 
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UN/AU mission, for example, was financed almost entirely by the 
European Union and the UN.139  Until western states came to the AU’s 
aid, the AU faced considerable difficulties in meeting the needs of the 
mission in Sudan as African armies lacked essential equipment such as 
helicopters and logistics equipment. 
Nonetheless, a key advantage to involving regional actors is that 
neighbors are more familiar than outsiders are with each other’s 
problems.  The disadvantage is that close proximity reduces impartiality 
and heightens the risk of involvement.140  There is also the problem of 
differences over applicable values.  A recent example is the sharp 
differences in the views held by the UN and the African Union over the 
indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court.  To maximize 
the benefits, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations 
must be based on strict observance of the principles and ideals of the UN 
Charter. 
In developing a mandate, as a political body, the Security Council 
focuses on consensus building, even though it can make decisions with 
less than unanimity.  But very often, the compromise required to build 
consensus can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting 
ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is 
then subject to varying interpretations.  The worst example of the 
consequences of an inadequate mandate is the Rwanda Genocide.  There 
was a lack of clarity as to whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
was needed.  There is general agreement that had action been taken in 
Rwanda, the genocide could very well have been averted.  Because an 
inadequate mandate could lead to the UN itself exacerbating a problem, 
it is crucial that peacekeeping missions are given robust mandates. 
It is important to emphasize that, in circumstances where a party to 
a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, 
continued equal treatment of all parties by the UN can, in the best case, 
result in ineffectiveness—and in the worst may amount to complicity 
with evil.  The UN is not a neutral actor and should not be; it is an 
organization guided by the core values of the UN Charter.  Impartiality 
does not mean neutrality.  Neutrality in the face of violations of the UN 
Charter norms only rewards the transgressors.  No failure did more to 
damage the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s 
 
 139. Id.  See also Addis Ababa, EU to Finance over Half of African Union Peace Mission Cost 
in Darfur, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 2004, http://www.Sudantribune.com/spip.php?ifrmed.page+ 
imprimable&id_article=6120. 
 140. For example, as previously noted, the Congo war drew in neighboring Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda. 
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than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor in such missions 
as the Congo in the 1960s. 
At a practical level, once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able 
to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully.  This means 
that UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other 
mission components, and the mission’s mandate.  Rules of engagement 
should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the 
initiative to their attackers.  UN peacekeepers have often come under 
attack for failing to protect civilians.141  In the Sudan, for example, there 
are complaints that UNAMID is failing to protect civilians.142  The 
problem appears to be that UN forces often seek Sudanese authorization 
to move around the country and do not move unless they are given 
clearance by the host government.  Further, the UN takes the view that 
the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the countries 
concerned.143  This is an unrealistic approach that cannot advance the 
objectives of the mandate and protect civilians.  Once the UN has a 
mandate and Status of Forces Agreement, the two documents should be 
the only guiding documents. 
Peacekeeping missions cannot succeed unless the warring parties 
agree to cooperate in the implementation of the mandate.  Force alone 
cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace maybe 
established.  As a result, consent of the parties is the bedrock principle of 
PKOs.  The problem is that local parties sometimes sign peace accords 
for a variety of reasons—not all of them favorable to peace—there are 
often “spoiler-groups” who renege on their commitments or otherwise 
seek to undermine a peace accord through violence.  In both Sierra 
Leone and Angola, the first PKOs did not produce lasting peace; in each 
country, challenged peace implementation threw the nation back into 
civil war.144 
 
 141. A United Nations official, Mr. A. Khare, Deputy Head of UN Peacekeeping Operations, 
admitted that UNAMID had failed to prevent armed rebels from raping hundreds of women in 
several Congo villages.  See UN Says Peacekeepers ‘Failed’ DR Congo Rape Victims, BBC NEWS, 
Sept. 7, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11224656. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Peace Keeping Under ECOMOC:  A Sub-regional 
Approach, in FROM PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES:  PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN 
AFRICA, supra note 30. See also United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Background, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/past/unamsil/background/html.  See also Gwinyayi 
Albert Dzinesa, A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia, 11 INT’L 
PEACEKEEPING, no. 4, 2004, at 644-62. 
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 For peacekeeping to succeed in reducing tension and averting 
conflict, the UN needs clear, unwavering, strong, and sustained political 
support from the Security Council and member states.145  Lack of 
support can result in delays or impediments to taking action, as well as a 
lack of sufficient resources to effectively implement a course of action 
once it has been decided upon. 
A. Readiness of Member States to Contribute Troops, Personnel, and 
Adequate Financial and Logistical Support 
The UN is totally dependent on the contributions of member states 
for peacekeeping missions; the UN does not have a standing army or 
police force.146  As is well known, the UN continues to experience a 
troop commitment gap.  Industrial states tend to prioritize deployment of 
their troops to operations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
states (NATO), the European Union and/or ad hoc coalitions authorized 
by the Security Council.  Developing countries continued to provide the 
largest numbers of military and civilian police personnel for UN 
PKOs.147  The commitment gap often translates into delays in 
deployment.  Examples of the effect of delays is in Liberia, where the 
UN force was authorized in August 2003, but by March 2004 it still had 
not achieved its full strength, delaying key programs such as the 
disarmament of combatants.148 
The speedy deployment of military, civil police, and civilian 
experts will not help to solidify peace and establish the credibility of an 
operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job.  To be 
effective, the mission’s personnel need material, equipment, and 
logistical support.  The early days of the Sierra Leone mission provides a 
very clear example of what could happen when men and women are 
deployed without logistical support:  lacking communications equipment 
and weapons to defend themselves, 500 UN peacekeepers were captured 
by rebel fighters in the early days of the Sierra Leone mission.149  
Willingness by member states to contribute troops to a credible 
 
 145. Rep. of the Special Comm. on Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶ 
7, U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
 146. Id. ¶ 84. 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 102-07. 
 148. U.N. Secretary-General, Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/2004/229 (Mar. 22, 2004). 
 149. U.N. Secretary-General, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 10-15, U.N. Doc. S/2000/186 (Mar. 7, 2000). 
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operation also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on 
behalf of the mandate; nevertheless, it is hard for countries to accept this 
reality. 
The missions in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and East Timor 
can be considered successful missions in terms of supporting multiparty 
elections that resulted in the formation of broad-based representative 
governments.  Although these missions operated in completely 
dissimilar environments, they are a useful indicator of the conditions for 
success.  As previously discussed, these conditions can be roughly 
divided into two categories:  the nature of the mandates and the 
resources available to each mission. 
In terms of respective mandates, in Cambodia, Namibia, and 
Mozambique, the warring parties had concluded a peace agreement and 
welcomed UN involvement and deployment of a peacekeeping force.  
Although it may seem obvious that a mission is more likely to succeed 
when opponents have already agreed upon a solution, it is important to 
note that this was not easily achieved at the outset in any of the three 
cases and was the result of intensive negotiations.  In Cambodia, 
Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge each remained determined to vanquish 
the other while their foreign suppliers were content to watch their 
proxies fight.  In Namibia, despite General Assembly and Security 
Council Resolutions, South Africa remained convinced for many years 
that a military victory over the guerrilla forces was possible.150  In 
Mozambique, a brutal war ranged for several years between FRELIMO 
and RENAMO as their backers remained prepared to fund the conflict.  
In each of these cases, serious negotiations began only after it became 
obvious to all parties involved in the conflict that a military stalemate 
had resulted,151 thus lending serious weight to the idea that a critical 
element for successful peacekeeping is the realization that outright 
victory for either side is unlikely, and a sound peace agreement which 
has the support of all the parties to the conflict is the best case scenario. 
An additional “success” factor in Cambodia, Namibia, and 
Mozambique was that the mandates of each mission and the respective 
peace settlement was negotiated primarily by outsiders, lending further 
credence to the view that UN PKOs are more likely to be effective when 
the UN is not intricately involved in the minute details of negotiations at 
the outset.  In Mozambique, the Vatican mediated the peace negotiations 
 
 150. Leopold Scholtz, The Namibian Border War:  An Appraisal of the South African Strategy, 
34 S. AFR. J. OF MIL. STUD. 19 (2006). 
 151. Ann L. Phillips, Mozambique:  A Chance for Peace, CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS 
CASE STUDIES SERIES NO. 10 8 (2010). 
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between FRELIMO and RANAMO, which led to a ceasefire and a peace 
agreement that the UN went in to implement.152  And, as already pointed 
out in the Cambodia case, the contours of the mission were sketched out 
at an array of informal meetings that allowed all of the relevant regional 
actors to make their preferences known.153  Likewise, in Namibia, the 
regional actors, through a group called the Front Line States, negotiated 
some of the terms of the peace settlement.154  These cases would suggest 
that regional blocks in some situations may be better incubators of UN 
mandates than the Security Council. 
B. Human Rights Violence—Current and Past 
Conflict situations are characterized by lack of respect for the rule 
of law, gross human rights violations, and impunity.  In a post-conflict 
society, some of the most difficult tasks include articulating a vision of a 
new society, dealing with past human rights violations, defining the 
fundamental principles by which the country will be transformed, and 
engaging in effective reconciliation.  The manner in which these 
processes are handled can play an important role in the consolidation of 
peace.  A peacekeeping mission must have a component within the 
peace process to develop mechanisms to address the development of a 
comprehensive program for national reconciliation.  Examples are the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that have been established in 
various countries emerging from gross human rights violations.155 
Indeed, there can be no lasting peace where a nation does not deal 
with its past and its citizens continue to be traumatized.  Each mission 
should have a humanitarian component to deal with the often tragic 
conditions that people in zones of conflict inhabit.  Many thousands of 
people are often driven from their homes in conflict zones.  In fact, it is 
estimated that there are now over 25 million internally displaced people 
worldwide—outnumbering refugees by more than two to one.156  A 
humanitarian component will ensure a more coherent and strategically 
coordinated humanitarian response to the plight of internally displaced 
people.  Particular attention should be given to addressing the needs of 
children. 
 
 152. Moise Vanacio, Mediation by the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique, 1988-1991, in 
MEDIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 147 (Stephen Chan & Vivien Jabri eds., 1993). 
 153. See LIEBENOW, supra note 135. 
 154. See KHADIAGALA, supra note 112. 
 155. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS 743 (2009). 
 156. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL & GLOBAL IDP PROJECT, INTERNATIONALLY DISPLACED 
PERSONS:  A GLOBAL SURVEY (2002). 
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C. Gender Component 
Similarly, a good peacekeeping mission should have a gender unit 
to ensure that gender equality in the mission, as well as the peace 
process, is mainstreamed.  Women have their own perspective and 
experiences to bring to conflict resolution, particularly in light of the fact 
that women are disproportionately impacted by conflict.157  After all, 
what can be more democratic than to ensure that every voice is heard in 
the political process?  One way of ensuring that gender is a critical part 
of the mission is to start with the mission itself.  There should be 
increased participation of women at all levels of the mission.  As has 
been observed—including through Security Council Resolution 1325—
mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding initiatives is critical to making 
societies more equitable and just.158  The inclusion of women in 
peacebuilding activities could help unshackle societies from patriarchy 
and promote a transformative agenda.  Such action must also facilitate 
the addressing of unequal power relations and gender inequality.159  The 
very first all-female peacekeeping force was deployed in Liberia in 
2007.160  Since then, scores of women have helped to disengage armed 
forces, protect civilians, and promote human rights.  The UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-Moon, has spoken about the positive impact women 
bring to peacekeeping, stating that “whether interviewing victims of 
sexual violence, working in women’s prisons, assisting female ex-
combatants reintegrating into civilian life, or mentoring female police 
cadets, women personnel have a clear advantage.  They can help 
empower women to rebuild their war-torn countries and act as role 
models.”161  Further, it has been noted that the presence of women 
peacekeepers in Liberia is reducing the incidence of sexual 
exploitation.162  For all of these reasons, a serious and robust gender 
component should be prioritized as a central component to each 
 
 157. See Sherrill Whittington, Security and Reconstruction in Africa:  Role of Security Council 
Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND 
RECONCILIATION:  WHEN THE WARS END, supra note 33, at 97. 
 158. Id. 
 159. GINYAYI A. DZINESA & ELIZABETH OTITODUN, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA:  PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS (Adekeye 
Adebajo & Mark Paterson eds., 2009). 
 160. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
 161. Ban Ki-moon, Remarks to Commission on the Status of Women High-Level Event 
Marking International Women’s Day—“Equal Rights, Equal Opportunities and Progress for All,” 
U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 3, 2010, http://un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/ 
statments_full.asp?statID=736.   
 162. Id. 
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peacekeeping mission—and should not be relegated to an after-thought 
or “soft issue.” 
D. Leadership of Mission 
Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a 
cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse 
circumstances and one that struggles to maintain those attributes.  The 
tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and 
ability of those who lead it.  The heads of UN peacekeeping missions are 
unique in their ex officio ability to make or break a peace operation and 
because they may significantly enhance an operation’s credibility and 
effectiveness through measured judgment strength of character and on 
the ground acuity.163  It is widely acknowledged that the success of the 
Mozambique mission was due to the excellent leadership provided by 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Aldo Ajello.164  It is 
important, therefore, that careful attention be given to choosing heads of 
peacekeeping missions; proven leadership, judgment, and integrity are 
among the core attributes that must be sought and demonstrated. 
V.  ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES IN A PEACEKEEPING MISSION  
In addition to the challenges discussed above, peacekeeping 
missions encounter issues relating to security and disarmament of 
combatants and their reintegration into society.  Peacebuilding makes a 
direct contribution to public security and law and order.  But the basic 
objective of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not met 
unless all three elements of the process are implemented.  These are 
always part of the major tasks that peacekeeping missions need to 
address.  As might be reasonably expected from the broad variety and 
scope of peacekeeping missions, the results over these issues have been 
mixed.  A number of conditions are necessary for a successful 
reconstruction, disarmament, and reintegration program.  Reconstruction 
is a critical objective for the long-term success of a mission.  David 
Keen makes the important point that when we talk about reconstruction 
 
 163. HEARNE, supra note 87, at 1. 
 164. Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg observed that “regional and extra-regional players 
provided crucial diplomatic and financial support to the peace process and stopped arming 
Mozambique’s warring factions; and the UN had an effective and energetic Special Representative 
in the person of Aldo Ajello.”  Adekeye Adebajo & Chris Landsberg, Back to the Future:  UN 
Peacekeeping in Africa, in MANAGING ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163 (Adekey 
Adebajo & Chandra Lekah Spiram eds., 2001).   
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it should be clear that it is not about reconstructing the exact social and 
economic conditions prevailing at the outset of a conflict that caused the 
problem in the first place.165  Failure to tackle the underlying grievance 
will be damaging in the long run.  Byron Tarr illustrates this point when 
he makes the argument that Liberia’s past efforts at reform are replete 
with failure because they all fail to address the underlying problems of 
marginalization of indigenous people, decentralization, and Liberia’s 
inability to decide whether it remains “an outpost of Western 
civilization” or is an African state desiring to be a responsible member 
of an integrating subregion.166 
Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants are key to 
immediate post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence.  Indeed, disarmament is the smallest part of the peace 
process while reintegration is often a bigger problem.  Whether 
economic and political reconstruction can begin depends on how quickly 
security spreads throughout the country.  Typically, the main spoilers are 
the politicians; the fighters are more committed to peace than their 
political masters.  Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) 
will tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate 
livelihood—that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into the local economy.  
In the end, economic development is critical to sustained demobilization 
and the peace process.  Reintegration is a long-term matter that must be 
linked to jump starting the country’s economy and giving fighters hope 
of better prospects.  Money will be needed to assist in providing training, 
skills, and vocational education.  Jobs are an essential ingredient of an 
effective reintegration strategy that will be critical for breaking the ties 
of fighters to their political masters.  The typical approach is to train ex-
fighters in various trades such as bricklaying and carpentry.  Without job 
opportunities to utilize the trades taught, the training does not provide 
real alternatives.  An example of what can happen when there is no 
meaningful reintegration is East Timor in 2006, where ex-combatants 
rebelled and started fighting with the army.167  Patterns of development 
that empower ordinary people through jobs and access to education and 
improved security will weaken the position of warlords and extremist 
 
 165. David Keen, War and Peace:  What’s the Difference, in MANAGING ARMED CONFLICT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 164, at 14.  
 166. Byron Tarr, Reconstruct Governance to Rouse Liberia, Long Forlorn, in SECURITY, 
RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION:  WHEN THE WARS END 206 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2006).  
 167. Following the collapse of the East Timorese police force, the United Nations extended the 
mandate of the 1440 international police and more than 1200 civilian staff and volunteers to remain 
in the country for twelve months.  See United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) 
Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/unmit/background.shtml. 
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politicians who offer to meet these needs through violence and 
harassment of the people. 
A separate challenge that should be considered in peacekeeping 
missions is that there is often too much focus on early elections in peace 
processes.  Elections are an important and necessary component of the 
democratic process, and most peace agreements call for elections early 
on in the process.  However, to conduct an election is a logistically huge 
undertaking.  It requires security and capacity.  Warlords have 
demonstrated time and time again that they benefit most from a 
premature rush to the ballot box and from the sham legitimacy that it 
confers.  It must be borne in mind that an election is a contest—and a 
contest is necessarily combative.  Elections therefore require clear rules 
so that even the losers trust that the rules have been applied justly; 
otherwise, former enemies will continue their rivalry and contest by 
other means.  In cases where elections are premature and poorly 
organized, the heightened expectations surrounding the elections can 
become a dangerous force.  In such situations, elections do not guarantee 
democracy; they, in fact, can make matters worse.  In this regard, one 
need only look at the Liberian elections in the 1990s that brought 
Charles Taylor to power and legitimized his rule.168 
An additional problem is too much focus on leaders rather than 
ordinary people.  UN peace processes are often built around leaders and 
do not pay sufficient attention to the ordinary people.  Typically, there is 
no parallel peace process on the ground.  The exception was South 
Africa, where Peace Accord Structures were established through 
legislation at national, regional, and local levels.169  The Structures, 
comprised of inclusive committees representing stakeholders at local 
community, district, and provincial levels, established and discussed the 
peace process and reconstruction of infrastructure damaged in political 
violence in the various communities.  These forums played a critical role 
in articulating the concerns of ordinary people and fed into the national 
process.170  The local Structures enable communities to contribute to the 
maintenance of a secure local environment for peacebuilding and enable 
 
 168. In Liberia, after the 1989 elections that brought Charles Taylor to power, the security 
situation deteriorated. Conflicts escalated and thousands of civilians were killed.  See United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ 
unmil/background.shtml. 
 169. Final Rep. of the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the U.N. 
Secretary-General (May 26, 1994). 
 170. In a bid to stem political violence, in September 1991, political parties and other 
stakeholders signed the National Peace Accord, in which all signatories pledged to promote peace 
and stability throughout South Africa. 
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the peacebuilder’s task of supporting the political, social, and economic 
changes that create a secure, self-sustaining environment.  After all, the 
goal of international intervention should always be seen first and 
foremost as facilitating local processes, providing resources, and 
creating the local actors to resolve their own problems. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article has offered some suggestions on how peacekeeping 
missions can be made more effective.  The success of a mission will 
depend largely on whether there is a clear and responsive peacekeeping 
mandate and whether the mandate is supported by adequate resources 
and effective leadership.  Mandates are texts that are open to a certain 
degree of interpretation.  In that respect, peacekeeping missions must be 
prepared to adapt mandates to local conditions and missions must show 
flexibility.  At the same time, mandates must be interpreted in a more 
expansive manner.  Since it is usually up to  the Force Commander and 
the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to direct the 
implementation of  the mandate, they may do so by going beyond the 
initial narrowly defined objective of the mandate when the 
circumstances demand such departure.  They should be informed by 
conditions on the ground.  In that respect, the peacekeepers must view 
the mandate as a floor rather than a ceiling.  This can be a helpful start 
for the adaptation of the mandate to the needs of the conditions on the 
ground and more effective peacekeeping. 
Among the lessons we have learned over time—including from the 
Liberian situation in 1990, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 2006—is 
that the world must not pull out from post conflict states too early.  
Consolidating peace and putting a country on the path to development 
requires sustained multi-year support.  It requires promoting 
development agendas that seek to transform the society and conditions 
that played midwife to the conflict.  Development agendas should put 
education, employment, and participation in governance at the heart of 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.  The temptation 
among donors to favor immediate results and short time planning 
horizons in dictating their commitments, do not lend themselves to the 
kind of slow and sustained support required for post-conflict 
peacebuilding.  The international community has to remain engaged long 
after the peace process is solved—otherwise, history repeats itself.  
Special attention must be paid to developing institutions of governance 
and public administration, a process which is, of course, complex.  First, 
governance is a concept that is wider than, but includes, public 
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administration.  Taking this into account, there is a need to guard against 
considering only institutions of government; the discussion must include 
institutions that facilitate collaboration, involvement, consultation, and 
participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public sector, private 
sector, and civil society) in the act of governance.  The UN has 
recognized this and important steps have been taken within the UN to 
establish structures to address some of these issues.  For example, this 
article mentioned the Peacebuilding Commission initiative, and there are 
others such as the establishment of a mediation support unit followed by 
a team of mediators to provide technical expertise and support for high-
level UN and regional mediators.  In addition, the UN has established 
regional offices in West Africa and Central Asia to support UN peace 
initiatives. 
Peacekeeping initiatives offer unique and extraordinary promise in 
bringing about and consolidating peace in the most dire of 
circumstances.  Given the enormity of the stakes, it behooves the 
international community to assess past peacekeeping experiences and 
draw from lessons learned.  Only with serious investment, planning, 
inclusion, and leadership can the promise of peacekeeping be realized—
and it is an objective well worth striving to reach. 
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